---
date: 2023-02-03
categories:
  - note
tags:
  - kubernetes
  - velero
title: How to use Velero in hardened Kubernetes cluster
description: Here are some workarounds to common issues encountered when deploying Velero in a production / hardened Kubernetes cluster
---

# Using Velero in hardened Kubernetes with Istio

I'm approaching the end of the journey of applying Velero to a client's "hardened" Kubernetes cluster, and along the way I stubbed my toes on several issues, which I intend to lay out below...

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## What is a hardened Kubernetes cluster?

In this particular case, the following apply:

* [X]  Selective workloads/namespaces are protected by Istio, using strict mTlS
* [X]  Kyverno is employed with policies enforcing mode using the "[restricted](https://github.com/kyverno/kyverno/tree/main/charts/kyverno-policies/templates/restricted)" baseline, with further policies applied (such as deny-exec, preventing arbitrary execing into pods).
* [X]  Kubernetes best-practices are applied to all workloads, audited using Fairwinds Polaris, which includes running pods as non-root, with read-only root filesystems, whever possible.

## How does Velero work?

Velero backup runs within a cluster, listening for custom resources defining backups, restores, destinations, schedules, etc. Based on a combination of all of these, Velero scrapes the kubernetes API, works out what to backup, and does so, according to a schedule. Typically you'd deploy the velero helm chart into your repository either manually, or using a GitOps-like tool, such as [FluxCD][flux] or ArgoCD.

## Velero backup hooks

While Velero can backup persistent volumes using either snapshots or restic/kopia, if you're backing up in-use data, it's usually necessary to take some actions before the backup, to ensure the data is in a safe, restorable state. This is achieved using pre/post hooks, as illustrated below, a fairly generic config for postgresql instances based on Bitnami's postgresql chart [^1]:

```yaml
extraVolumes: # (1)!
- name: backup
  emptyDir: {}

extraVolumeMounts: # (2)!
- name: backup
  mountPath: /scratch

podAnnotations:
  backup.velero.io/backup-volumes: backup
  pre.hook.backup.velero.io/command: '["/bin/bash", "-c", "PGPASSWORD=$POSTGRES_PASSWORD pg_dump -U $POSTGRES_USER -d $POSTGRES_DB -F c -f /scratch/backup.psql"]'
  pre.hook.backup.velero.io/timeout: 5m
  pre.hook.restore.velero.io/timeout: 5m
  post.hook.restore.velero.io/command: '["/bin/bash", "-c", "[ -f \"/scratch/backup.psql\" ] && \
    sleep 1m && \
    PGPASSWORD=$POSTGRES_PASSWORD pg_restore -U $POSTGRES_USER -d $POSTGRES_USER --clean \
    < /scratch/backup.psql && rm -f /scratch/backup.psql;"]' # !(3)
```

1. This defines an additional ephemeral volume to attach to the pod
2. This attaches the above volume at `/scratch`
3. It's necessary to sleep for "a period" before attempting the restore, so that postegresql has time to start up and be ready to interact with the `pg_restore` command.

[^1]: See the bitnami chart [here](https://github.com/bitnami/charts/tree/main/bitnami/postgresql)

During the process of setting up the preHooks for various iterations of a postgresql instance, I discovered that Velero will not necessary check that carefully re whether the hooks returned successfully or not. It's best to completely simulate a restore/backup of your pods by execing into the pod, and running each hook command manually, ensuring that you get the expected result.

## Velero vs securityContexts

We apply best-practice securityContexts to our pods, including enforcing of readOnly root filesystems on the pod, the disabling of all capabilities, etc. Here's a sensible example:

```yaml
containerSecurityContext:
  allowPrivilegeEscalation: false
  capabilities:
    drop: ["ALL"]
  readOnlyRootFilesystem: true
  seccompProfile:
    type: RuntimeDefault   
  runAsNonRoot: true
```

However, on the node-restore agent, we need to make a few changes to the helm chart above:

```yaml
  # Extra volumes for the node-agent daemonset. Optional.
  extraVolumes:
  - name: tmp
    emptyDir:
      sizeLimit: 1Gi  

  # Extra volumeMounts for the node-agent daemonset. Optional.
  extraVolumeMounts:
  - name: tmp
    mountPath: /tmp # (1) 

  containerSecurityContext:
    allowPrivilegeEscalation: false
    capabilities:
      drop: ["ALL"]
      add: ["CHOWN"] # (2)! 
    readOnlyRootFilesystem: true
    seccompProfile:
      type: RuntimeDefault
```

1. node-agent tries to write a credential file to `/tmp`. We create this emptydir so that we don't need to enabel a RW filesystem for the entire container
2. Necessary for restic restores, since after a restic restore, a CHOWN will be performed

## Velero vs Kyverno policies

We use a Kyverno policy as illustrated below this, to permit users from execing into containers. It was necessary to make an exeception to permit Velero to exec into pods:

```yaml
{% raw %}
apiVersion: kyverno.io/v1
kind: ClusterPolicy
metadata:
  name: deny-exec
  annotations:
    policies.kyverno.io/title: Block Pod Exec by Namespace Label
    policies.kyverno.io/category: Sample
    policies.kyverno.io/minversion: 1.4.2
    policies.kyverno.io/subject: Pod
    policies.kyverno.io/description: >-
      The `exec` command may be used to gain shell access, or run other commands, in a Pod's container. While this can
      be useful for troubleshooting purposes, it could represent an attack vector and is discouraged.
      This policy blocks Pod exec commands to Pods unless their namespace is labeled with "kyverno/permit-exec:true"
spec:
  validationFailureAction: enforce
  background: false
  rules:
  - name: deny-exec
    match:
      resources:
        kinds:
        - PodExecOptions
        namespaceSelector:
          matchExpressions:
          - key: kyverno/permit-exec
            operator: NotIn
            values:
            - "true"
    preconditions:
      all:
      - key: "{{ request.operation || 'BACKGROUND' }}"
        operator: Equals
        value: CONNECT
    validate:
      message: Invalid request from {{ request.userInfo.username }}. Pods may not be exec'd into unless their namespace is labeled with "kyverno/permit-exec:true"
      deny:
        conditions:
          all:
          - key: "{{ request.namespace }}"
            operator: NotEquals
            value: sandbox # (1)!
          - key: "{{ request.userInfo.username }}" # (2)!
            operator: NotEquals
            value: system:serviceaccount:velero:velero-server 
{% endraw %}            
```

1. "sandbox" is a special, unprotected namespace for development
2. Here we permit the velero-server service account to exec into containers, which is necessary for executing the hooks!

## Velero vs Istio

If you're running Istio sidecars on your workloads, then you may find that your hooks mysteriously fail. It turns out that this happens because Velero, by default, targets the **first** container in your pod. In the case of an Istio-augmented pod, this pod is the `istio-proxy` sidecar, which is probably not where you **intended** to run your hooks!

Add 2 additional annotations to your workload, as illustrated below, to tell Velero **which** container to exec into:

```yaml
pre.hook.backup.velero.io/container: keycloak-postgresql # (1)!
post.hook.restore.velero.io/container: keycloak-postgresql
```

1. Set this to the value of your target container name.

## Velero vs Filesystem state

Docker-mailserver runs postfix, as well as many other components using an init-sort of process. This makes it hard to backup directly via a filesystem backup, since the various state files may be in use at any point. The solution here was to avoid directly backing up the data volume (*and no, you can't selectively exclude folders!*), and to implement the backup, once again, using pre/post hooks:

```yaml
{% raw %}
additionalVolumeMounts:
- name: backup
  mountPath: /scratch
  
additionalVolumes:
- name: backup
  persistentVolumeClaim:
    claimName: docker-mailserver-backup

pod:
  # pod.dockermailserver section refers to the configuration of the docker-mailserver pod itself. Note that teh many environment variables which define the behaviour of docker-mailserver are configured here
  dockermailserver:
    annotations:
      sidecar.istio.io/inject: "false"
      backup.velero.io/backup-volumes: backup
      pre.hook.backup.velero.io/command: '["/bin/bash", "-c", "cat /dev/null > /scratch/backup.tar.gz && tar -czf /scratch/backup.tar.gz /var/mail /var/mail-state || echo done-with-harmeless-errors"]' # (1)!
      pre.hook.backup.velero.io/timeout: 5m
      post.hook.restore.velero.io/timeout: 5m
      post.hook.restore.velero.io/command: '["/bin/bash", "-c", "[ -f \"/scratch/backup.tar.gz\" ] && tar zxfp /scratch/backup.tar.gz && rm -f /scratch/backup.tar.gz;"]'
{% endraw %}
```

1. Avoid exiting with a non-zero exit code and causing a partial failure

## PartiallyFailed can't be trusted

The Velero helm chart allows the setup of PrometheusRules, which will raise an alert in AlertManager if a backup fully (*or partially*) fails. This is what prompted our initial overhaul of our backups, since we wanted **one** alert to advise us that **all** backups were successful. Just one failure backing up one pod therefore causes the entire backup to be "PartiallyFailed", so we felt it worth investing in getting 100% success across every backup. The alternative would have been to silence the "partial" failures (*in some cases, these fail for known reasons, like empty folders*), but that would leave us blind to **new** failures, and severely compromise the entire purpose of the backups!

## Summary

In summary, Velero is a hugely useful tool, but lots of care and attention should be devoted to ensuring it **actually** works, and the state of backups should be monitored (*i.e., with `PrometheusRules` via AlertManager*).

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